but also small community hospitals.3 Countries such as Japan have been overwhelmed by the MRSA epifocal outbreaks and US $28 000-1 600 000 per year for control of endemic MRSA; (v) giving antibiotics to demic, with reported rates of methicillin resistance constantly higher than 80%. Finally, communitycolonized patients may not be in the interest of the individual patient; and (vi) decolonization regimens acquired MRSA has become a reality, no longer limited to intravenous drug abusers, and MRSA may lead to antimicrobial-resistant strains. On the other hand the main and compelling arguments for can no longer be considered solely a nosocomial pathogen. 4, 5 controlling MRSA are: (i) MRSA infections add to nosocomial infection rates and cause substantial mor-A significant proportion-at least 30% according to studies-of in-patients who become colonized by bidity and mortality; (ii) MRSA can spread rapidly within hospital wards and within hospitals; (iii) MRSA MRSA will develop severe infection such as pneumonia, bacteraemia, or wound infection.6,7 The cohort strains have a remarkable tendency to develop multiple resistance to antimicrobials, and the possibility of colonized or infected MRSA patients usually constitutes the most significant in-hospital reservoir from of resistance being transferred to staphylococci and other Gram-positive organisms is worrying; (iv) once which MRSA is transmitted to other individuals:6,8 the larger the reservoir, the higher the incidence of crossintroduced into a facility, MRSA strains become endemic, and formidable efforts may be needed to transmission and severe life-threatening infection. Outbreaks of MRSA infection are frequent in higheradicate them; (v) the size of the in-hospital reservoir of MRSA patients is correlated with the incidence of endemic-rate institutions (Á0.5 MRSA cases per 100 hospital admissions) and are mostly associated with severe infections; (vi) when MRSA account for more than 5-10% of S. aureus clinical isolates within an poor compliance with handwashing/hand disinfection practices.7 Less commonly, chronically coloninstitution, general use of glycopeptides-in particular vancomycin-increases for treatment of conized health-care workers can disseminate MRSA directly.7,9,10 Whereas in the past a predominant firmed MRSA infections, for empiric therapy, and for perioperative surgical prophylaxis; in the absence of strain of MRSA used to be present in a single institution, clonal diversity is now commonly reported. methicillin resistance, glycopeptides are not first choice, and are more expensive and more toxic than Once introduced in the health care setting, MRSA strains add to the overall burden of nosocomial infecmost other antimicrobials; (vii) glycopeptide use may forster the emergence of vancomycin-resistant tions;8,11,12 once present, they are difficult to eliminate. However, studies examining the impact of microorganisms (in particular Enterococcus faecalis, Enterococcus faecium, but also S. haemolyticus, strictly-followed isolation measures to control MRSA transmission found a decrease in the incidence of Pediococcus spp, Leuconostoc spp): multiresistance is presently synonymous with the absence of curendemic MRSA infection and cross-transmission.6,7,13 rently-available satisfactory antimicrobial therapy, importance of hospital reservoirs, or whether they should be performed during an outbreak only. This and such organisms have been shown to be responsible for nosocomial infections. Stringent policies have systematic approach appeared to be cost-effective in a recent report.13 Surveillance cultures from personbeen proposed to limit the spread of vancomycinresistant enterococci in health-care institutions;16 nel may be justified, if epidemiological investigations suggest that a member of the staff is a permanent (viii) Last but not least, vancomycin-resistant S. aureus17 will certainly emerge in hospitals with carrier, but are not recommended as a routine measure. high endemic rates of MRSA and increased associated use of vancomycin.
MRSA mostly spread from patient to patient via the transiently-colonized hands of health-care workers Control strategies for MRSA must be developed by each health-care institution on the basis of factors during patient contact or handling of contaminated materials. Thus, strict compliance with standard presuch as the MRSA endemic infection rate, the occurrence of MRSA outbreaks, and the resources available cautions such as handwashing/hand disinfection and the use of barriers against contact with blood and for infection control. In agreement with proposals by Boyce,18 we consider that (at least) the following body fluids prevents most cases of cross-transmission, even without the need for recognition of individual circumstances mandate control measures: (i) institutions with a high incidence of severe MRSA infec-MRSA carriers. Contact precautions (gloves and gown for any contact with MRSA patients) may be needed tions; (ii) recent introduction of MRSA into institutions which had no colonized or infected patients;
during an outbreak. The use of a mask is usually not recommended, except in conditions where aerosols (iii) introduction of MRSA into a high-risk unit (intensive care or burn unit); (iv) increased prevalence of could be produced (i.e. pneumonia, debridement of MRSA wound infection); some infection control MRSA, resulting in increases in the empiric or prophylactic use of vancomycin; (v) MRSA outbreaks practitioners recommend, however, that a mask should be used to increase the compliance with involving more than 20 patients, a condition associated with a significant reduction of changes for furhandwashing/hand disinfection practices. Special housekeeping efforts are usually not necessary, ther eradication within the institution.18
According to a recent survey, 91% of US hospitals except in specific wards where environmental reservoirs could be implicated.7 take infection control measures against MRSA.18 Similar figures are not available for Europe. Some
As mentioned above, and to sum up, recommendations for MRSA control should be adapted to European hospitals consider that they have been ization are undertaken using nasal mupirocin ointment and chlorhexidine body wash, in particular in isolated in single rooms; furthermore, since many of the MRSA strains were introduced in the country from the setting of an outbreak. (e) Patients previously known to be MRSA carriers are isolated upon readabroad, patients admitted to Dutch hospitals or transferred from hospital outside the country are housed mission to our institution, and negative surveillance cultures for MRSA are required to terminate contact in single rooms for a few days and kept under isolation precautions until the results of microbiological isolation. Using hospital information-system-based automatic alerts for MRSA patients, we confirmed screening for MRSA carriage are obtained. 19 Whatever control strategy is chosen, it must be that at least on third of the hospital reservoir could be identified upon readmission through an admission practical, and socially, psychologically and financially acceptable for the patients and the institution.
identification list of all patients harbouring MRSA during a previous hospital stay; a high proportion Furthermore, any control strategy should be evaluated for a period much longer than the average dura-(33% in our study) of those patients remained persistent carriers.8 (f ) Antibiotic control should be protion of MRSA carriage to have a chance of demonstrating efficacy. It is still unsettled whether moted in all institutions, but in particular in those with endemic multiresistant organisms. patients' surveillance cultures for MRSA should be used as a routine measure to detect and estimate the Last but not least, innovative infection control 
